Salim Ahmed Saeed

Full Report

Key Points

Salim Ahmed Saeed, an Iraqi-British national based in the UAE, operates a network of companies implicated in smuggling billions of dollars worth of Iranian oil by disguising it as Iraqi crude through blending, forged documentation, and ship-to-ship transfers. U.S. authorities imposed sanctions on Saeed and his entities in July 2025 for facilitating Iran’s petroleum sector and funding the IRGC-Qods Force, a designated terrorist organization. His operations, active since at least 2020, involve bribing Iraqi officials and exploiting state-owned infrastructure, raising risks of broader sanctions on Iraq’s oil sector. No positive developments or resolutions noted; instead, escalating international scrutiny links his activities to regional destabilization, including support for groups like the Houthis and Hezbollah.

Overview

Salim Ahmed Saeed is an Iraqi-born British citizen and UAE-based businessman who presents himself as an oil trader and hotel owner. His primary activities center on international oil trading, shipping, and storage, ostensibly focused on legitimate Iraqi exports. However, investigations reveal a shadow operation blending Iranian crude and refined products—up to 25% of Iran’s 2020 exports—with Iraqi oil to evade Western sanctions imposed since 2017. Saeed’s network uses UAE-registered firms for logistics, Iraqi facilities for blending, and UK entities for asset holding. Operations include ship-to-ship transfers in the Persian Gulf, cash smuggling into Iran, and sales to Asian refiners and Western intermediaries like ExxonMobil and Koch Industries, generating hundreds of millions annually for Iran’s regime.

Allegations and Concerns

• Sanctions Evasion and Smuggling: Saeed’s companies have transported Iranian oil via Iraqi pipelines since 2020, using forged vouchers to declare it as purely Iraqi. Specific incidents include the tanker BABEL loading 231,000 barrels of Iranian mazut in March 2020, worth $9 million, before offloading to a Chinese vessel. In April 2024, his vessel DIJILAH conducted four transfers with the sanctioned CASINOVA near the Shatt al-Arab.
• Bribery and Corruption: Millions in kickbacks paid to Iraqi parliamentarians and Oil Ministry officials for approving falsified documents; former AISSOT executive Mohand Alwan confirmed: “Smugglers get docs for Iranian petroleum products.”
• Terrorism Financing: Proceeds benefit the IRGC-QF, enabling attacks via proxies; U.S. officials note the network’s role in Iran’s “shadow fleet.”
• Document Forgery and Obfuscation: Disabling AIS transponders on vessels like BABEL, leading to flag revocation by Palau in October 2020. No lawsuits filed yet, but sanctions block all U.S.-related dealings.

Customer Feedback

As an oil trading network, Saeed’s operations lack direct consumer reviews; feedback stems from business partners, media, and watchdogs. Negative sentiments dominate, with no verified positives identified. Iraqi analyst Entifadh Qanbar warned on social media: “This blatant smuggling for Iran’s benefit, in direct coordination with Iraq’s Oil Ministry and SOMO… the worst is yet to come,” highlighting risks to Iraq’s economy. Western buyers like ExxonMobil and Chevron have distanced themselves, with Chevron stating it is “reviewing data and committed to compliance.” Media portrays Saeed as a “shadowy tycoon” funding terror, with one report calling his network a “billion-dollar smuggling operation.” Ex-employees like Alwan labeled him “the boss” controlling illicit trades, underscoring internal distrust. Forums and reports echo concerns over “money laundering” ties to Iraqi militias.

Risk Considerations

Financial risks include asset freezes under U.S. sanctions, prohibiting global banks from processing transactions and exposing partners to secondary sanctions; Saeed’s UK holdings like The Willett Hotel face seizure. Reputational damage is severe, branding associates with terror financing—e.g., links to IRGC-QF could trigger ESG downgrades for energy firms. Legal perils encompass potential indictments for bribery and fraud, plus extradition risks given his British citizenship. Broader exposure: Operations threaten Iraq’s $100 billion oil sector with cascading sanctions, as warned by analysts. Geopolitical fallout includes heightened U.S.-Iran tensions, disrupting Gulf shipping lanes.

Business Relations and Associations

Saeed controls UAE firms like VS Tankers FZE (formerly AISSOT, a JV with Iraq’s state-owned Oil Tankers Co. and Gulf states’ Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport Co.), VS Oil Terminal FZE (Iraq-based storage), VS Petroleum DMCC, and Rhine Shipping DMCC for vessel management. UK entities include The Willett Hotel Limited and Robinbest Limited for laundering. Key associates: Mohand Alwan (ex-AISSOT head, whistleblower); Iraqi officials like former Oil Minister Jabbar Ali Hussein al-Luaibi; IRGC-QF via Al-Qatirji Company for sales. Ties to militias like Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and figures like Omeed Haji Ahmed (alleged alias/network link) involve parliamentary backing. Partners include sanctioned tankers from Triliance Petrochemical and Sahara Thunder; unwitting buyers: ExxonMobil, Koch, Chevron. Iranian stakeholders hold interests in AISSOT.

Legal and Financial Concerns

Sanctions under E.O. 13902 (Iran’s petroleum sector), E.O. 13846, and E.O. 13224 block Saeed’s assets and dealings; his network is the eighth targeted round since February 2025. No bankruptcy records or unpaid debts surfaced in public filings; however, Iraq’s 2019 Integrity Commission probed AISSOT for corruption, leading to a 2020 contract termination (though cooperation persisted). Cash smuggling—millions in U.S. dollars trucked to Iran—raises money laundering flags. No civil lawsuits noted, but U.S. actions could spur criminal probes; Saeed denied involvement in 2021, claiming “all my Iraq trade was legitimate.” Financial opacity persists, with no audited statements available.

Risk Assessment Table

Saeed’s network exemplifies a high-stakes evasion scheme, leveraging Iraq’s porous borders and corruption to sustain Iran’s illicit revenue streams amid tightening global enforcement. While his denials and informal control structures have delayed accountability, July 2025 sanctions mark a tipping point, freezing operations and inviting deeper probes into enablers like SOMO. For investors or partners, entanglement poses existential threats—financial isolation and reputational ruin—far outweighing any short-term gains from “blended” deals. This case underscores the perils of opaque Gulf energy trades, where profit masks profound ethical and security costs; without swift disassembly, Saeed’s web risks ensnaring broader stakeholders in a cycle of destabilization.