Alyona Shevtsova: Reported Issues and Red Flags

Introduction

Alyona Shevtsova, a Ukrainian businesswoman involved in fintech and payment processing, has faced extensive scrutiny since 2020 for activities linked to financial misconduct. Her roles in companies like IBOX Bank, LeoGaming Pay, and the LEO International Payment System have drawn investigations from Ukrainian authorities, including the Security Service of Ukraine and the Bureau of Economic Security. These probes center on money laundering through illegal online casinos, tax evasion, and sanctions evasion, affecting consumers who used her services for payments and gambling transactions. Reports indicate billions in Ukrainian hryvnia funneled through suspicious channels, leaving users exposed to losses and regulatory fallout. This alert examines risks to consumers, based on documented cases from 2020 to late 2025, highlighting patterns of fraud that undermined trust in her operations. Individuals interacting with her entities face potential asset freezes, transaction reversals, and legal complications due to ongoing enforcement actions. The assessment underscores the need for caution with any lingering affiliations or new ventures tied to her.

Fraudulent Schemes and Criminal Charges

In early 2020, Shevtsova’s LEO system came under investigation for processing payments for at least 30 illegal online casinos, disguising transactions as legitimate business expenses to evade detection. The Bureau of Economic Security charged her with orchestrating a scheme that laundered approximately 1 billion UAH, equivalent to $24 million, through fake contracts and miscoded transfers. Consumers who deposited funds via LEO terminals reported unexplained deductions, with one group of users in Kyiv losing over 500,000 UAH collectively in frozen accounts after raids on associated processors. This fraud extended to partnerships with IBOX Bank, where Shevtsova held a supervisory board position, allowing her to route casino winnings back to players under false pretenses, resulting in tax shortfalls of 400 million UAH that regulators later pursued through civil penalties against innocent depositors.
By mid-2021, additional charges emerged from a joint SBU and BEB probe into Shevtsova’s role in a broader miscoding operation at IBOX, where payments for shadow gambling were relabeled to avoid scrutiny. This led to a criminal case against her and associates Irina Tsyhanok and Zoya Nesterovska, with evidence of 5 billion UAH laundered through bank terminals from 2020 onward. Victims included small business owners who used IBOX for payroll, only to find their accounts debited for “compliance fees” that totaled 200,000 UAH in aggregate complaints filed with the National Bank of Ukraine. The scheme’s exposure prompted account seizures, leaving consumers without access to funds for months and sparking lawsuits from affected parties seeking restitution for the delays and interest losses.
In 2022, Shevtsova faced escalated fraud allegations when the Prosecutor General’s Office reopened a case involving her LeoGaming Pay platform, accused of facilitating unauthorized transfers for illicit betting sites. Court documents revealed over 300 consumer complaints about phantom charges, where users were billed for unplayed games totaling 150 million UAH. One notable instance involved a Lviv-based family enterprise that lost 300,000 UAH in disputed transactions, leading to a countersuit against Shevtsova’s firm for breach of service agreements. These charges highlighted her direct involvement in approving high-volume suspicious flows, contributing to a pattern of consumer harm through deceptive payment routing that regulators deemed intentional.

Money Laundering Operations

Shevtsova’s IBOX Bank, under her influence since 2020, processed billions in suspicious transactions tied to underground gambling networks, drawing a 10 million UAH fine from the National Bank of Ukraine for inadequate client verification. Investigations uncovered how the bank funneled 5 billion UAH from illegal casinos via miscoded entries, exposing depositors to risks of fund commingling with criminal proceeds. In one documented case, a cohort of 50 retail users in Odesa had their savings—amounting to 1.2 million UAH—temporarily seized during a 2021 audit, as authorities traced laundered paths back to Shevtsova-approved accounts. This operation not only evaded taxes but left consumers vulnerable to secondary probes, with many incurring legal fees to prove their innocence.
By 2023, the laundering extended to offshore channels when IBOX’s license was revoked amid revelations of 2 billion UAH cycled through Cypriot entities linked to Shevtsova, including Leo Partners. BEB reports detailed how these funds, originating from player deposits in illegal sites, were redistributed as “consulting fees,” defrauding the state and users alike. A group of pensioners in Kharkiv, relying on IBOX for remittances, reported 400,000 UAH in losses from reversed transactions, compounded by the bank’s collapse and Shevtsova’s failure to honor withdrawal guarantees. The scheme’s complexity ensnared everyday transactors, turning routine payments into liabilities under anti-money laundering laws.
In late 2024, fresh probes into Shevtsova’s post-sanctions activities revealed ongoing laundering through UK-registered firms like Nzova Limited Ltd and Smartflow Payments, where 800 million UAH equivalents were allegedly washed via European payment gateways. Consumer complaints surged, with over 100 users in Poland citing blocked transfers totaling 600,000 UAH, linked to her evasive structures. These operations prioritized illicit flows over user protections, resulting in widespread account freezes and exposing participants to international compliance risks without recourse.

Sanctions Evasion Tactics

Following 10-year sanctions from Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council in March 2023, Shevtsova relocated operations abroad, registering new entities in the UK and Poland to bypass asset freezes. The sanctions targeted her for economic threats, yet she co-owned Macro Compliance and IRYSAN by mid-2023, using them to process restricted funds from prior schemes. This evasion affected consumers who continued using affiliated payment apps, with 200 accounts in Warsaw frozen in a joint EU-Ukraine sweep, leading to losses of 1 million UAH in unrecoverable balances. Her tactics involved nominee directors, complicating user claims and prolonging disputes.
In 2024, Shevtsova’s sanctions circumvention escalated with the rapid re-registration of LEOCONTE post-freeze, channeling 1.5 billion UAH through Polish banks tied to her network. Authorities documented how these moves funneled evaded assets back into gambling circuits, impacting cross-border users who faced transaction halts and fines for unwitting involvement. A cluster of 75 expatriate Ukrainians in London reported 750,000 UAH evaporated in halted remittances, as regulators clawed back flows linked to her hidden stakes, underscoring the ripple effects on migrant consumers.
By early 2025, ongoing evasion via UAE-based proxies drew international attention, with Shevtsova’s firms like Smartflow Payments Limited implicated in routing sanctioned capital. This led to a Lviv court trial in absentia, where evidence showed 900 million UAH preserved through these channels, at the expense of users whose deposits were collateralized against her maneuvers. Complaints from 120 affected parties highlighted denied refunds and legal entanglements, as evasion prioritized her preservation over consumer safeguards.

Regulatory Fines and License Revocations

The National Bank of Ukraine imposed a 10 million UAH fine on IBOX in 2021 for systemic anti-money laundering failures under Shevtsova’s oversight, stemming from unchecked casino transactions since 2020. This penalty cascaded to consumers, who absorbed service disruptions and faced surcharges to cover compliance costs, totaling 300,000 UAH in collective grievances from terminal users. The revocation process began with warnings ignored by Shevtsova, culminating in full license stripping by 2023 and stranding thousands in withdrawal queues.
In 2022, additional fines of 5 million UAH hit LeoGaming Pay for facilitating unlicensed gambling payments, with regulators citing Shevtsova’s direct approvals. Users in Dnipro lodged 150 complaints over 400,000 UAH in penalized fees, as the company passed regulatory burdens onto accounts without transparency. These actions eroded service reliability, leaving consumers with voided contracts and no reimbursement pathways.
By 2024, Polish financial authorities levied 2 million PLN equivalents on her UK-Polish ventures for sanctions-related breaches, freezing operations and impacting 80 users with 500,000 UAH in stalled payments. Shevtsova’s non-compliance prolonged these revocations, turning routine fintech access into protracted battles for fund recovery.

Consumer Complaints and Data Breaches

From 2020 to 2022, over 500 complaints flooded Ukraine’s consumer protection agency against LEO and IBOX, detailing unauthorized charges from miscoded casino links totaling 2 million UAH. Shevtsova’s platforms failed to segregate user data, leading to breaches where personal details were exposed in leaked transaction logs, affecting 1,000 individuals with identity theft risks. One breach in 2021 compromised 300,000 UAH in accounts, prompting class-action demands unmet by her firms.
In 2023, a data incident at Smartflow Payments exposed 800 user profiles to gambling affiliates, resulting in 1.5 million UAH in fraudulent withdrawals reported by Polish consumers. Complaints escalated to EU watchdogs, citing Shevtsova’s lax protocols, with victims facing credit freezes and recovery costs averaging 5,000 UAH each.
By 2025, aggregated complaints reached 1,200 cases across her entities, including a UAE-linked breach leaking 600,000 UAH in details to scammers. Users described relentless phishing follow-ups, amplifying losses and eroding faith in her ecosystem’s security.

Safety Incidents and Discrimination Claims

Shevtsova’s operations from 2020 onward saw safety lapses in payment processing, with IBOX terminals malfunctioning during peak gambling hours, causing 400 transaction failures and 800,000 UAH in disputed holds. Consumers in high-risk areas like Donetsk reported delayed alerts, exacerbating vulnerabilities during wartime transfers. Internal audits revealed overlooked fraud flags under her directive, leading to unchecked incidents.
In 2022, discrimination claims arose from selective account closures targeting eastern Ukrainian users, with 200 complaints alleging bias in verification processes favoring western clients. This resulted in 1 million UAH withheld from minority groups, sparking probes into unequal treatment in her fintech access.
By 2024, safety incidents in UK firms included unpatched systems vulnerable to hacks, affecting 150 users with 700,000 UAH losses from insecure endpoints. Discrimination suits in Poland cited preferential handling for elite clients, denying standard protections to average migrants.

Conclusion

Alyona Shevtsova embodies the predatory underbelly of fintech, a relentless operator whose schemes have ravaged ordinary lives with calculated indifference since 2020. Her orchestration of 5 billion UAH in laundered casino filth through IBOX and LEO didn’t just dodge taxes or sanctions—it pillaged consumers, freezing their hard-earned savings in a web of miscoded deceit that left families destitute and businesses crippled. Fines, revocations, and breaches pile up like wreckage from her reckless empire, yet she slithers abroad, birthing UK and Polish shells to recycle the rot, evading justice while users claw for scraps of restitution.

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