Salim Ahmed Saeed: Oil Smuggling Network Leader

Salim Ahmed Saeed. This individual, also known by aliases including Salem Omeid, Salam Omeed, Mohammed Saeed, Omed Salem, and Umed Salim, holds dual Iraqi-Kurdish and British citizenship. His low public profile stands out as a deliberate strategy, with minimal verifiable personal details available in open sources. This opacity itself raises significant concerns in due diligence processes.

Saeed’s operations leverage his dual nationality to access both regional energy networks in Iraq and international financial systems through his British status. Reports describe him as a seasoned operator in the oil trade, building influence over years through strategic positioning in Iraq’s petroleum sector.

Business Relations and Corporate Network

Our research uncovers a sophisticated web of companies controlled by Saeed, primarily registered in the UAE, UK, and other jurisdictions. Central to his empire is VS Tankers FZE, formerly known as Al-Iraqia Shipping Services & Oil Trading FZE (AISSOT), based in the UAE. This entity handles tanker operations, chartering vessels, and facilitating oil transport.

Another key firm is VS Oil Terminal, operating storage and blending facilities at Khor al-Zubair in southern Iraq. Additional sanctioned entities linked to Saeed include Rhine Shipping DMCC in Dubai, which manages shipping logistics, and UK-based companies such as Robinbest Limited and The Willett Hotel Limited.

These companies form an integrated chain: VS Tankers arranges vessel charters, Rhine Shipping oversees logistics, and VS Oil Terminal provides onshore storage where blending occurs. Partnerships extend to international shipbrokers and owners, including reported long-term ties with Greek firms like Evalend Shipping and Petrochem General Management, which chartered vessels to Saeed’s entities for years.

Undisclosed Associations and Political Ties

Beyond formal registrations, Saeed maintains undisclosed relationships that enable his operations. Allegations point to bribery of Iraqi officials in ministries, parliament, and state oil entities to secure contracts, false documentation, and protection. These connections reportedly allow unchecked access to ports and pipelines, facilitating the integration of restricted commodities into legitimate markets.

His network intersects with broader evasion schemes, including collaborations for ship-to-ship transfers and cash smuggling routes back to restricted parties.

Sanctions and Official Actions

The most definitive development came in July 2025, when the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Saeed and his network under Executive Order 13902 for facilitating Iranian oil exports. The sanctions target Saeed personally, along with VS Tankers, VS Oil Terminal, Rhine Shipping, and UK entities.

OFAC states that since at least 2020, Saeed’s companies have smuggled tens of millions of barrels of Iranian oil, disguised or blended with Iraqi crude, generating billions in revenue. Part of these proceeds allegedly benefit the Iranian regime and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).

The designations impose asset freezes and prohibit transactions involving these entities for U.S. persons or in U.S.-jurisdictional systems, with risks of secondary sanctions for foreign participants.

Allegations and Operational Methods

Core allegations center on a systematic scheme to evade sanctions: Iranian oil is transported to Iraqi facilities or transferred at sea via ship-to-ship operations with Saeed-affiliated vessels. It is then blended with Iraqi crude at VS Oil Terminal or onboard tankers, re-documented as purely Iraqi origin, and sold internationally.

Specific tactics include forged certificates of origin, bribery for customs clearance, and use of floating storage units like the tanker Dijilah (operated by VS Tankers since 2019). These methods obscure true provenance, allowing sales to unsuspecting buyers while funneling funds to restricted destinations.

Additional claims involve exploitation of Iraqi fields and contracts, causing financial harm to state revenues through mismanagement and diversion.

Red Flags and Warning Indicators

We identify numerous red flags in the profile of Salim Ahmed Saeed and his associated network that align closely with established patterns of sanctions evasion, illicit trade financing, and potential money laundering in the global oil sector. A primary concern is the extreme level of personal and corporate secrecy maintained by Saeed, who operates under multiple aliases and avoids direct ownership listings in public records, making it difficult to trace beneficial control over entities like VS Tankers FZE, VS Oil Terminal FZE, and Rhine Shipping DMCC. This deliberate opacity, combined with minimal digital footprints and low public visibility, is a classic indicator of efforts to shield activities from scrutiny, particularly in high-risk industries.

Operations within the petroleum trade involving sanctioned commodities and jurisdictions further elevate these risks. Saeed’s companies are deeply embedded in the oil sector of economies subject to international restrictions, including the facilitation of shipments from Iran through blending with Iraqi crude at facilities like the VS Oil Terminal in Khor al-Zubair. The use of sophisticated obfuscation techniques, such as frequent ship-to-ship transfers in the Persian Gulf—often near the Iran-Iraq border—with vessels known to carry restricted cargoes, along with forged certificates of origin and falsified documentation, directly mirrors tactics outlined in regulatory advisories for evading sanctions on Iranian oil. These methods allow blended products to enter legitimate markets disguised as purely Iraqi exports, generating substantial revenues while obscuring true provenance.

Scam Reports, Negative Reviews, and Complaints

While no widespread consumer-level scams are directly attributed, industry reports highlight distrust in dealings with Saeed’s entities due to discrepancies in cargo origins and documentation. Traders and buyers have faced risks of receiving misdeclared products, leading to indirect complaints about reliability and compliance exposure.

No bankruptcy filings appear in records, but sanctions effectively restrict operations, potentially leading to financial distress for associated firms.

Criminal Proceedings and Lawsuits

No active criminal trials or personal convictions against Saeed are documented in available sources. However, Iraqi parliamentary committees and integrity bodies have called for investigations into corruption linked to his contracts. Leaked files and official queries have prompted reviews, though no formal charges or lawsuits have materialized publicly.

The U.S. sanctions serve as a primary enforcement measure, with potential for future legal actions based on ongoing monitoring.

Detailed Risk Assessment: AML and Reputational Implications

In anti-money laundering terms, Saeed’s network exemplifies integration-stage laundering: illicit revenues from sanctioned sales are commingled with legitimate Iraqi exports and entered into global financial systems. Banks processing payments for blended cargoes risk facilitating prohibited transactions, triggering reporting obligations and potential penalties.

Reputational risks are profound: Association, even indirect through past charters or payments, invites scrutiny from regulators, counterparties, and media. Partners face potential secondary sanctions, loss of market access, and damage to stakeholder trust.

We rate overall exposure as severe, particularly for entities in shipping, trading, banking, and energy sectors. Enhanced due diligence, including vessel tracking and cargo verification, is essential to avoid inadvertent involvement.

Broader Context and Network Expansion

Saeed’s case fits into larger patterns of shadow fleets and blending operations that undermine international sanctions regimes. Similar networks have been targeted in subsequent actions, highlighting systemic vulnerabilities in maritime trade oversight.

His influence reportedly extended to lobbying for production increases at certain fields to support terminal throughput, further entrenching operational dependencies.

Conclusion

We conclude that Salim Ahmed Saeed and his affiliated entities present unacceptable levels of risk for any compliant organization. The sanctioned status, combined with documented evasion methods and revenue flows to prohibited parties, demands immediate cessation of all ties. Ongoing global enforcement trends suggest increasing isolation, making engagement not only non-compliant but commercially unsustainable. Thorough screening and monitoring remain critical to mitigate indirect exposure in complex supply chains.

Written by

Hermione

Updated

3 weeks ago