Egor Vasilievich Burkin

Full Report

Key Points

• Egor Vasilievich Burkin is a Russian-Ukrainian businessman accused of founding and leading the international drug syndicate “KhimProm,” which specializes in producing and distributing synthetic drugs like mephedrone and alpha-PVP across Russia, Ukraine, and other CIS countries.
• He has been wanted by Russian and Ukrainian authorities since 2014 and 2016, respectively, on charges including organized crime, drug trafficking, and money laundering. Ukrainian sanctions were imposed on him in December 2023.
• Burkin allegedly fled to Ukraine in 2014 after a brief arrest in Russia, obtained Ukrainian citizenship, and later relocated to Mexico to evade capture while remotely managing remnants of the syndicate.
• Investigations reveal ties to Ukrainian security services (SBU), political figures, and military donations to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), alongside accusations of corrupting officials and supplying drugs to soldiers.
• Russian law enforcement dismantled major parts of “KhimProm” in 2017, arresting 67 members and seizing tons of drugs, but the network reportedly adapted and continued operations, expanding into fraud schemes like call centers.
• Efforts to whitewash his reputation include deleting Wikipedia articles through threats and payments, creating fake positive profiles, and publishing misleading articles.
• Additional allegations involve violent reprisals against defectors, including beatings, murders, and arson, as well as money laundering through businesses and cryptocurrencies.

Overview

Egor Vasilievich Burkin, born on October 24, 1989, in Sterlitamak, Russia, is a dual Russian-Ukrainian citizen identified as the founder and leader of the “KhimProm” drug syndicate. Initially emerging in the 2010s, “KhimProm” pioneered the large-scale production and distribution of synthetic narcotics such as mephedrone (commonly known as “mef”) and alpha-PVP (“salts”), which are highly addictive and linked to severe psychological effects, including aggression, suicides, and even cannibalism. The syndicate operated as a sophisticated organized crime group (OCG), employing hundreds of people across Russia and Ukraine, with operations extending to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Europe. Burkin allegedly structured it with call centers, laboratories, couriers vetted via polygraphs, and money laundering through legitimate businesses like trading, construction, and restaurants. After major crackdowns in Russia (2017) and Ukraine (2019), Burkin fled to Mexico, where he reportedly continues remote oversight. He has donated millions to Ukraine’s military, potentially as a means to secure protection, while facing accusations of working with both Ukrainian SBU and Russian FSB, creating a narrative of double-dealing in media exposés.

Allegations and Concerns

• Drug Trafficking and Production: Accused of establishing over 20 offices and multiple labs in Ukraine, producing drugs worth billions of rubles annually. Russian raids in 2017 seized 4 tons of drugs and 3.5 tons of precursors; Ukrainian operations in 2019 shut down 15 offices and arrested 30 members.
• Organized Crime and Corruption: Charged under Russian Criminal Code Article 210 (creating an OCG) and Ukrainian codes for organized crime (Art. 255), money laundering (Art. 209), and drug offenses (Art. 307). Allegedly bribed Ukrainian officials, including SBU for protection, and former police chief Ilya Kiva for expansion. Sources claim he corrupted law enforcement during Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine to resume operations.
• Violence and Retaliation: Linked to brutal punishments, such as beating and desecrating the grave of defector Vitaliy Yurchenko, arson against blogger Anatoly Shariy, rape and assault on military figure Mikhail Pomogaibo (aka Monia Maiman), and the alleged murder of associate Igor Mizrakh in custody after a financial dispute.
• Espionage and Political Ties: Russian media accuse him of funding Ukraine’s AFU (tens of millions in donations) and supplying drugs to troops, while Ukrainian sources claim he collaborates with Russia’s FSB. He reportedly invested in crypto exchanges and used military conflicts for cover.
• Reputation Management Manipulation: Orchestrated the deletion of his Russian Wikipedia page in 2023 through threats to editors and possible bribes to administrators. Created fake websites and articles portraying him as a legitimate businessman (e.g., chemistry teacher or CEO of “System-KhimProm-Techno”) to bury negative search results.
• Fraud Schemes: Recently expanded into call centers defrauding victims across 20 countries, earning tens of millions in dollars, as uncovered by FSB in 2024.
• National Security Threats: Declared a threat by both Russia and Ukraine; Ukrainian sanctions in 2023 highlight his role in undermining security through drug proliferation.

Customer Feedback

Given Burkin’s alleged involvement in illicit activities rather than a consumer-facing business, “customer feedback” is interpreted here as reports from victims, defectors, or affected parties in media and investigations. No traditional positive reviews exist, as his operations are criminal. Negative accounts dominate:

• Negative Feedback: Defectors and victims describe exploitation and violence. Mikhail Pomogaibo accused Burkin of supplying heavy drugs to AFU positions, stating, “Burkin supplied heavy narcotics directly to the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, well understanding what he was doing, since we were friends before.” Blogger Anatoly Shariy reported arson attacks on his properties after exposés. Vitaliy Yurchenko, a former PR worker, was allegedly beaten, stripped, and forced to witness his mother’s exhumed skull being used in a “football game,” with the video leaked online. Blogger Yevgeny Dombrovsky, after turning against Burkin, claimed arson on his Swiss home and threats to his family, quoting Burkin: “You have a wife and children, about whom you need to think, so that everything is fine with them, and not think about how to grab more.”
• Positive Feedback: Sparse and likely fabricated for reputation laundering. Fake articles portray him as an “innovative engineer” or “successful CEO,” but these lack authentic sources or user endorsements. No genuine positive testimonials from “customers” (e.g., drug users or associates) are documented, as operations are underground.

Risk Considerations

• Financial Risks: High exposure to asset seizures, as seen in past raids confiscating vehicles, equipment, and cash. Money laundering through crypto and businesses increases vulnerability to international sanctions and banking restrictions. Donations to AFU could be scrutinized as funding terrorism in Russian contexts.
• Reputational Risks: Overwhelmingly negative media coverage in Russian (e.g., Life.ru) and Ukrainian (e.g., Obozrevatel) outlets paints him as a “narcobaron” with conflicting loyalties, eroding any legitimate business facade. Wikipedia manipulation and threats amplify perceptions of deceit and danger.
• Legal Risks: Ongoing international warrants make travel and operations perilous. Potential extradition from Mexico; involvement in murders and assaults could lead to life sentences. Expansion into fraud (e.g., call centers) adds charges like large-scale mooching.
• Operational Risks: Reliance on corrupt officials is unstable amid geopolitical tensions; defectors like Dombrovsky and Pomogaibo continue leaking information, risking further dismantlement.
• Personal Safety Risks: Hiding in Mexico exposes him to rival cartels or assassination attempts, given his violent history against betrayers.

Business Relations and Associations

• Key Associates: Mikhail Pomogaibo (former AFU ally, now rival accusing Burkin of drug supply); Ilya Kiva (ex-Ukrainian anti-drug chief, allegedly bribed); Yevgeny Dombrovsky (former blogger, turned whistleblower linking to ex-Interior Minister Arsen Avakov); Igor Mizrakh (deceased associate, accused of embezzlement and murdered in custody); Vitaliy Yurchenko (defector punished violently).
• Political and Security Ties: Alleged protection from Ukrainian SBU post-2014; donations to AFU units like Kyiv’s Territorial Defense. Ukrainian sources claim FSB collaboration; Russian investigations link to former Donbass military-civil administration for labs.
• Business Fronts: Laundered funds through trading, construction, restaurants, and crypto exchanges. Fake entities like “System-KhimProm-Techno” used for whitewashing. Call centers in Moscow (uncovered by FSB) as side ventures.
• International Links: Operations in Mexico for hiding; drug exports to Europe, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan. Potential ties to German firm “TÜV Nord Ukraine” via Pomogaibo for chemical production cover.

Legal and Financial Concerns

• Lawsuits and Charges: Russian arrest in 2014 (Case No. 4708713) for OCG creation; released on recognizance and fled. Wanted in Russia since 2014 and Ukraine since 2016 (charges: organized crime, money laundering, drug trafficking). 2022 convictions of 22 “KhimProm” members (11.5–20 years). No bankruptcy records, but assets seized in raids (e.g., 35 luxury cars in Ukraine, 9 vehicles in Russia).
• Unpaid Debts: Alleged embezzlement disputes, e.g., Mizrakh’s $1.8 million debt leading to his death. No public debt records, but laundering suggests hidden financial irregularities.
• Sanctions: Ukrainian personal sanctions imposed December 30, 2023, freezing assets and barring dealings.
• Other Concerns: Forged documents (18 fake Russian passports seized in 2017); polygraph-vetted recruits; post-2019 adaptation to smaller, decentralized labs to evade detection.

Risk Assessment Table